The Evolution of Russsia, by Otto Hoetsch, Thames and Hudson, London 1966

In 1584 it would have been impossible to understand the 'Time of Troubles
which followed.

Nevertheless, the two decades of Ivan's terror proved that, how-
ever much autocracy had developed in Moscow since Ivan Kalita
and Ivan III, opposing forces still existed. They were reflected in-
directly in the peasant movements of which we have spoken; they
found more direct expression in the opposition of the nobility and
in the National Assemblies {Zemskiye Sobory}, which historians have
often underestimated. Though the Russian assemblies may never
have attained the same importance, diets and assemblies comparable
to the Estates of western Europe met in Moscow in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. They were usually made up of the nobility,
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though from time to time they included other Estates as well. In
spite of their antagonism, however, the Tsar and the nobility usually
co-operated against the peasants: Russia under Ivan IV was a country
dominated by these two elements. As the administration grew,
officials became more prevalent, and they too were aligned with the
higher strata of society as an instrument of oppression. The merchant
class, since it was partly involved in the economic and trading
interests of the crown, maintained rather more independence, though
it suffered as well.

The Tsar, who was himself interested in theological speculation,
did not interfere with or oppress the Church. On the contrary, its
power increased considerably during this period, as its economic
position showed. It possessed vast territories, numerous vassals and
dependants, and had its own system of justice. The Church's position
became even stronger after the conquest of Constantinople by the
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Turks, for the Metropolitan of Moscow now took the place of the
Patriarch, claiming the rank of protector of all Orthodox Christians.
From 1589 onwards he was autonomous, with the title of Patriarch.
Behind him stood the Russian state. His relationship with the govern-
ment was never formally and constitutionally defined, but it was
implicit in the doctrine that Moscow was the 'third Rome'. This
doctrine gathered strength after the beginning of the sixteenth
century. 'Two Romes have passed', it was proclaimed, 'the third
[i.e. Moscow] stands fast; and there shall be no fourth.' Moscow's
claim to be the successor of Byzantium, though never recognized
outside Russia, heightened the Church's standing at home, and was
frequently exploited in Russia's Balkan policy from the seventeenth
to the twentieth centuries.

In conformity with Byzantine tradition the Church submitted itself 
utterly to the ruler of the state, who was the anointed of God.
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He did not concern himself with purely religious questions, but the
Church was totally dependent on him. With its tendency to centrali-
zation, it supported the absolute power of the state. In exchange, as
a result of vast donations and privileges, it gained enormous econo-
mic and social power, and its alliance with the Tsardom assured its
legal position. A struggle of the spiritual and temporal powers,
similar to the war between the 'two swords' which so weakened
the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Ages, was unknown in
Russia until the seventeenth century.

There is no doubt that the Church at this time was useful to the
Russian state. It is also true that the connexion between Church and
state affected the Church's own inner life, leading to rigidity and
spiritual decline. It is, however, easy to exaggerate these con-
sequences. Ever since the days of Vladimir I, Christianity had pene-
trated deep into the hearts of the Russian people. Orthodoxy lacked
neither substance nor depth of religious feeling. The Orthodox
Church was a mystical community, regulated by its liturgy, with
powers of salvation. It was a distinct form of Christian organization,
separate from and opposed to the Roman Catholic Church of the
West, and it rejected the Pope's claim to overlordship. It is not easy
to make a final judgment on the significance of the Church in the
first Moscow period, but we can say that, by the end of the sixteenth
century, it was much more a conservative disciplinary institution,
co-operating with the prince and the ruling classes, than a consoler
of troubled hearts.

Because of its own peculiar ecclesiastical development, Russia had
no part in the process of ferment which affected the West from the
period of the crusades to the great voyages of discovery, or in the
Renaissance and the Reformation, and which led to the emergence
of individualism and a new emphasis on human personality. The
medieval Russian was European in spirit, without doubt, but he
was influenced by collective bonds, which were accentuated by
pressure from the state and from the ruling classes, and by adversity.
As yet he had developed no literature or learning worth talking
about, though he had achievements to his credit in the sphere of
ecclesiastical architecture. He was very far removed from western
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Europe. Nor did Europe penetrate far into Russia before the end of
the sixteenth century, apart from the few influences already men-
tioned. None the less, though remote from Europe, Russia was its
outer bulwark. As Klyuchevsky has written, fate placed the Russian
people 'at the eastern gate of Europe, which it defended against the
attacks of the nomad plunderers of Asia'. They 'saved European
civilization from the onslaughts of the Tartars'. But in the process
they 'fell behind the rest of Europe'.

'Sentinel duty', Klyuchevsky concludes, 'is always a thankless job
and is soon taken for granted, especially if it is well performed: the
more alert the guards, the more peacefully sleep those they protect,
and the less inclined the latter are to realize the true value of the
sacrifice their peaceful rest demands. This was Moscow's position in
Europe at the end of the sixteenth century.'

THE 'TIME OF TROUBLES' (1584-1613)
AND THE FIRST TSARS OF THE ROMANOV DYNASTY (1613-89)

The reign of Ivan IV marked the climax of the first Moscow period.
After this peak had been reached, a sharp decline set in; indeed, even
at the time of Ivan IV's rise to power it is evident that the seeds of
dissolution were germinating. Shortly after his death revolutionary
upheavals broke out in many quarters; the ferment was accentuated
by the weakness of his successor, Fyodor I, much as the Revolution
of 1789 was caused by that of Louis XVI. The result was the up-
heavals of the 'Time of Troubles', the first great revolution in Russian
history.

Fyodor I (1584-98), Ivan's son, was a weakling and bigot, with
whom the Rurik dynasty finally perished. The Tsar's half-brother,
Dmitri, the last descendant of the house of Ivan Kalita, was assas-
sinated in 1591, and public opinion put the blame on Boris Godunov,
Fyodor's brother-in-law. A man of Tartar provenance, Boris took
over the government, endeavouring in an intelligent and statesman-
like way to safeguard the interests of the state and of the ruling
feudal class. He contributed considerably to the extension of serf-
dom, to the chaining of the peasants to the soil and their submission
to the arbitrary will of the landowners. But he was not able to hold...
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The social crisis under Tsar Alexis was accompanied by a religious
and ecclesiastical crisis which also had important consequences. Just
as the patriarch Philaret had stood by Michael's side, sharing in the
government, so in the time of Alexis the office of Patriarch was in
the hands of another important ecclesiastical prince, Nikon. For a
time Nikon's position was almost that of regent. The result was a
breach with the Tsar; Nikon was stripped of his office and banished.
Nevertheless a real conflict of Church and state was implicit in his
attitude. 'The priesthood', Nikon maintained, 'is higher than the
Tsardom. Unction comes from God, but it comes to the Tsar through
the clergy.' But Nikon was unable to make his point of view
prevail. He found no support amongst the clergy, which ecclesiastical
tradition had not prepared for such claims to power over the state.
The Tsar proved stronger than the Church.

Nikon also caused a schism in Russian Orthodoxy which lasted
for centuries. From 1654 onwards he set about improving the
liturgical books, whose text was extremely corrupt, but in the pro-
cess he aroused the conservative opposition of clergy and people.
Though it is difficult to understand this disagreement today, since
it was concerned not with dogma but with words and forms, it led to
a split in Russian Orthodoxy which has never been completely
healed. Millions of orthodox Christians became schismatics—not
sectarians, but orthodox believers who held fast to certain external
forms and for this reason were known as 'old believers' (starovyery).
Though good, sober citizens, from that time onward they were
persecuted and only the edict of toleration of 30 April 1905 gave
them a certain degree of peace and civil recognition. This schism
may be described as a conflict between the people's Church and the
official Church, a reaction against the transformation of the Orthodox
Church into an instrument of state.

The schism was yet another sign of how profoundly Russia had
been stirred by the 'Time of Troubles'. It was in a state of social,
political and spiritual turmoil, and deeply influenced by Europe.
This was evident not only in technology and industry but also in
literature. An outstanding figure was the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
A. L. Ordyn Nashchokin (dismissed in 1671, died in 1680), a first-
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class diplomat and the first Chancellor of Russia, who was in
favour of adopting Western models. Thus he was one of the first
of those who, in the nineteenth century, were to be known as
'Westernizers'. The very existence of a 'Westernizing' movement
indicates that a new period in the history of Russia was beginning.
The common idea that Peter the Great turned Russia towards the
West without previous preparation, that he imposed Westernization
upon a barbaric un-European people, is entirely false. Already in
the preceding decades Russia had been awakened. The needs of the
army, of finance and of the economy had already led to reforms,
and from there it was only a step to the reform of schools and
education. Hence it is wrong to regard Peter the Great as a revolu-
tionary innovator. He found something like a programme of reform,
and a propitious atmosphere, already in existence. It is true that he
carried out his reforms with revolutionary energy. But much of what
Peter I later put into practice had been prepared by the policies of
his predecessors.
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...raising it. All those liable to tax were registered in a 'Revision
of Souls', the first of which dates from 1718. This led to an extension
of serfdom, which greatly accelerated the process effusion between
the peasantry and the old slave classes.

On the other hand, Peter the Great made few changes in the status
of the townspeople, who were in an advantageous position since he
depended on them for his commercial and industrial policies. The
nobility, however, were inscribed in a new 'table of ranks' arranged
in fourteen grades or classes (1722). This system, by which anyone
could rise through service into the nobility, first personally and then
on an hereditary basis, broke the backbone of the old aristocracy
and became a characteristic feature of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Russia. Peter never called a meeting of the Zemski Sobor.
The Estates played no role in his reign. But under him the social
and economic privileges of the non-tax-paying nobility were con-
firmed and extended. At the same time, the whole of society was
brought within the existing system of compulsory service which
became a rigid basis for the social structure right down to 1861.
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Every individual and every class was to live not for himself but for
the state and the Fatherland.

Peter also strove to bring order into the chaotic political administra-
tion. In 1708 he divided the land into provinces (yoyevodstva},
grouped in eight Gouvernements (an expression he introduced). At
the centre, representing his own authority, he created the Senate
(1711) and the so-called 'Colleges' (1718), which can be compared
with modern ministries. He also established elected organs of
administration. In all cases he attempted to imitate the administrative
methods of European absolutism. But the reforms were carried out
in the midst of war, and for this reason many were improvised and
unsystematic. None the less they were to have important and lasting
consequences.

He also forced the Church into his system. The Patriarchate was vacant 
and he never again filled the office. In its place he set up a state
authority, the Most Holy Synod (1721), of which the leading mem-
ber was a layman, the Chief Procurator. He remained immensely
important right down to 1917. The clergy, in short, were to be
civil servants just as much as the lay bureaucrats.
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Compared with the peasantry the urban population was still
numerically a negligible quantity. It consisted largely of petty-
tradesmen, with a thin layer of industrialists beginning to emerge,
and it would be an exaggeration to speak of it as a 'middle class'.
There were also the intelligentsia, the men of letters who, while part
and parcel of society, already felt themselves to be outside the class
Structure. Since the time of Alexander I they had been the represen-
tatives of a growing social and intellectual opposition.

Such, broadly speaking, was the disjointed and discordant social
structure that existed in Russia in the time of Nicholas I, dominated
by the absolutism of the imperial autocracy. In principle this was un-
limited, but it did not, in fact, extend to control of the administra-
tion. In appearance a military despotism, this-autocracy depended on
tbe support of the decaying nobility, the army, and the bureaucracy,
which in recompense were allowed to hold full sway. The working
people had no say in government at all; they were merely instru-
ments. Nor was the situation improved by the conquests of Peter
the Great and Catherine II, of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Their effect
was to intensify the centralization of government. Through the
annexation of the Baltic provinces, of Poland, Lithuania, Finland
and Bessarabia, Russia had acquired a large number of non-Russian
subjects and had become a composite state. But it was ruled from St
Petersburg in a more centralized way than ever before, and the
government adopted a  policy of unification and 'Russification' as
an answer to the discontent of the subject peoples. It was determined
to establish internal unity, if necessary by force, to impose the
Russian language and the Orthodox faith. Thus the reign of Nicholas I
saw the beginnings of Great Russian nationalism and of a policy
which was bound in the end to lead to difficulties.

The government also continued its efforts towards territorial
expansion, which it treated as though it were its raison d'etre. After
1813 no one threatened Russia, but the government pressed on ever
further, towards the sea and ice-free harbours, at the same time
beginning that 'pursuit of the frontier' which provided the impetus for
colonization across the Urals as well as in the Caucasus. It was no
longer a question of defence. The empire had expanded far beyond
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its national limits. Where would its lust for territory now drive it:
to the Straits, to Constantinople, or to dominion over the Balkans?
Inevitably Russia's expansionist tendencies affected its relations
with the rest of Europe. Westernization, followed by territorial
acquisitions on that frontier, had brought Russia far more closely
into contact with western Europe. In its political and economic
structure it followed European models and it aspired to do so in the
cultural field. But its policy of rigorously isolating itself from the
West meant that for most Europeans the conditions prevailing in
Russia were as enigmatic as the sphinx. Though Russia was now a
member—-indeed, the dominating member—of the European con-
sortium, its ambitions in the Near East made it a permanent source
of international unrest and a threat to European peace; it was always
prepared to take up arms against liberal movements in western
Europe, and for this reason was feared and hated.

This aggressive foreign policy undoubtedly overtaxed Russia's
strength, a fact which became apparent to all under Nicholas I. The
government and the people had been at loggerheads for centuries;
now there was added a conflict between the state and society, or at
least between the state and the intelligentsia. In the first half of the
nineteenth century a powerful and resourceful intellectual and poli-
tical opposition arose, which became an important factor in the
period of reform inaugurated by the Crimean War.

The opposition was led largely by men of letters, and for this
reason some indication of the part they played in Russian history is
necessary. Our starting-point is Mikhail Vassilyevich Lomonosov
(1711-65), whose intellectual achievements, especially his use of
language, matched Peter the Great's in the political sphere. Through
Lomonosov the Russian language became a wonderfully pliable and
expressive literary vehicle. After his death a period of astonish-
ingly rapid development began, which soon secured Russian
writing a place in world literature. Its special characteristics were
evident at an early stage—sympathy with the people, a craving for
social justice and liberty, hostility to oppression of all kinds. It was,
in short, a literature of criticism and opposition. For decades it was the
mouthpiece of Russian opinion, in a way that had no parallel in any...
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...necks and was to cause a great deal of trouble in the future; though
finally, when it became evident that the payments were too great a
burden, they were remitted.

These were the main terms of the Edict of Emancipation, It freed
47 million people. Peasants on the crown lands had received their
freedom somewhat earlier, on slightly better terms; the additional 
number involved here was 22 million. The effect of the whole vast
operation was to transform the existing social order, to bring about
radical changes in agriculture, and to open a new era of wage-
earning labour and capitalism. 'Man of Galilee, you have won,'
cried Herzen, acknowledging the Tsar's achievement.

But our praise for Alexander II's initiative in freeing the serfs
needs qualifying in a number of respects. First, the Tsar was to some
extent responsible for the measure's limited effectiveness. The in-
adequacy of the plots of land allotted to the peasants and the heavy
burden of the redemption payments led directly to the agrarian 
crisis which was plainly evident by the 'seventies. Secondly, nothing
was done about the mir, or peasant community, which continued in
existence until 1906. Its weaknesses were simply not recognized. No
one would admit that its organization was out of date and that it
hampered and frustrated the peasants. It was unable to help its
members. As the population increased and the land was split into
small parcels, the mir was unable to provide land for them all, or to
prevent the emergence of a landless proletariat. In fact, it was an
antiquated institution which should have been replaced either by
a system of private peasant ownership or by a form of co-operative.
Preserved largely for sentimental reasons, it became a source of evils
and anomalies which also contributed to the growing agrarian crisis.

No large-scale peasant movement occurred for a number of years
as a result of these conditions though already in 1861-2 more than
2,000 cases of local peasant unrest were reported. But it was not
long before the peasant communities, which were supposed to be
self-administering units under the control of the rural districts
(volost), fell into decay. This was partly the result of sheer poverty,
partly the consequence of social differentiation. Within the villages
there appeared an upper stratum of rich peasants, or kulaks, and a 
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lower, poverty-stricken stratum, the village proletarians and semi-
proletarians. These landless or nearly landless peasants were to be
the mainstay of the agrarian revolution.

The emancipation of the peasants was by far the most important
of Alexander II's reforms, but by no means the only one. A whole
series of other measures followed. The Decree concerning Rural
Authorities in the Gouvernements and Districts (1864) established
local self-government of a limited sort, the local assembly (zemstvo)
being reinforced by representatives of the nobility, the towns and
the peasants. In 1870 there was a new ordinance for the cities. In 1884
the law courts were brought into line with modern European legal
practice, a measure whieh was probably the best of all Alexander's
reforms. Modification of the censorship followed in 1865 though it
was still far from satisfactory. In 1871, regulations were issued for
the reform of secondary schools, followed by others for elementary
schools. Though the latter measures already showed the influence
of reactionary trends, it was to be applauded that state, zemstvo
and Church all now began to tackle the desperately neglected prob-
lem of elementary education. Another reform abolished the heredi-
tary clerical caste and brought the clergy into line with the new
social structure. A budget was introduced, but there was no com-
prehensive reform of the system of taxation as a whole. Finally, there
was Alexander's introduction of general conscription in 1874, on
which the armed forces were based until the end of the First World
War.

Thus his reforming activity covered practically every aspect of
national life. Taken as a whole, it was of fundamental importance.
It might have heralded the opening of a new age in Russia if, in the
second half of his reign, reactionary tendencies had not got the upper
hand. From then until 1905 there was a return to a rigid conservative
absolutism which was hostile to all reform.

It might reasonably have been expected that the work of reform
would be completed by some form of popular representation. This
was demanded by both the radical and the moderate reformers,
but it was refused by the Tsar and by the ruling factions. Despite
the concessions which had been wrung from them, ...
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